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Poles in Defense of Latin Civilisation in Europe, 21st Century

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Abstract: From the viewpoint of sociology of culture/nation, it is worth considering the problem of Poland's cultural identity in the context of today's political changes. This study is carried out to point out measures to protect national identity and European civilization. The adopted approach is based on qualitative analysis of mass media communications (mainly Polish right-wing periodicals paying more attention to these issues) as well as related literature. For this study, we identify the determinants of Polish national identity, the related hazards, and protective measures. The importance of the Catholic Church was highlighted along with factors such as historical and literary traditions as well as chivalric code and independent ethos. The hazards are faced by entire Western Europe, in the context of the cultural war. The result shows that left-wing ideologies, popular in mass media, constitute a danger for the world of traditional, religious, and national values. Therefore, the protection of cultural heritage and identity requires the active involvement of the state and non-governmental institutions. On the other hand, threats originating from outside of the European civilization need to be considered. It is also necessary to support cultural heritage, implement appropriate historical policy, and patriotic education.

Keywords: Culture, Values, Patriotism, Cultural Code, Polish Character

> "Idemptitas est mater societatis"
> Wincenty Kadłubek (12th/13th century)
> "We, Polish people, have a great history, and we have nothing to be ashamed of,
> quite the opposite: we should be proud of it."
> Dr. Andrzej Duda, President of the Republic of Poland
> (proclamation, August 6, 2015)

1. Introduction

From the viewpoint of sociology of culture and nation, it is worth considering the problem of Poland's cultural identity in the context of the currently observed political changes and European integration. The issues related to the threats faced by European Latin civilization are also interesting. We investigate the essence of Polish national identity to describe and explain the dominant axiology related to the essence and opportunities and threats in historical and religious in local and international contexts. We aim to point out measures aiming to protect national identity and European civilization. The Polish example is significant, so intentionally reported here. We particularly examine the identity of Poland and the social identity of Poles. We refer to historical facts which are widely known in Poland but less known in other countries. The aim is to show today's relationship of the sense of identity of Poles with the cultural context of this nation and concerning today's threats.

The scientific/theoretical framework of this study includes the following: theory of civilization, sociology of culture, and sociology of nation as perceived by F. Koneczny, M. Golka, and Z. Krawczyk. For the study, it is necessary to define the terminology. The term social identity, as used here, means self-identification of an individual in the group to which they belong. It is linked with the realization regarding characteristics shared by the group and awareness of the distinctive nature of the group. In particular, this is an expression of an individual's relation to their nation. Giddens says that people's concerns related to their identity result from "the growing doubt and sense of risk – humans live in a world of multiple choices, awareness of risks which consequently lead to anxiety, imbalance, uncertainty, no sense of security..." (Giddens 2002, p. 23). Does a defined axio-normative system not cover the lack of symbolic danger and uprooting?

From the viewpoint of sociology of culture, cultural or socio-cultural identity is a set of genealogical features, an attitude to one's group, and cultural symbols –which provide a sense of meaningfulness and a recognized system of values (cf. Golka 2008, p. 116-117). This identity affects individual and personal self-identification. By analogy, national identity also needs to be defined.

From the viewpoint of sociology of culture and sociology of nation, national identity is co-created by three components – religion, language and historical tradition. In particular the dominant religious or ideological systems influence the worldview, mentality and attitude of various areas of culture.

For the problem of national identity, there is a need for creative institutional effort (education) as well as individuals' endeavors for rational patriotism and avoiding threats of nationalism (Nikitorowicz 2013). National and country affiliation sometimes differ. Bauman (1990 p. 167-168) was an opponent of the nation-state. In his opinion, patriotism means "obedience to state authorities". On the other hand, nationalism is "unconditional faithfulness to one's nation" (Bauman 1990, p. 175). That means that on one side there is a country (geographical area) and a state identified with its authorities, and on the other side there is a nation as an "imaginary community", whose "members identify themselves intellectually and emotionally with the collective" (Bauman 1990, p. 177). Is a nation-state an outdated concept today?

What matters is about Poland rather than a statistical Pole, who in actuality does not exist. Poland has a centuries-long cultural heritage in over one thousand years of a long history and the 1050th anniversary of its christening. Even if the pre-Christian Lechitic kingdom was a state, it was only the baptism of Mieszko I that introduced Poland to Latin civilization. Later Bolesław I Chrobry completed his father's achievement by unifying the majority of the Lechitic lands within the kingdom. In the following years, Christianity has co-created Polish culture and identity. <<The Polish word "*ojczyzna*" (homeland) is linked with the concept and the actuality of being a father (Polish: *ojciec*). Polish word '*ojczyzna*' (fatherland) is nearly the same as 'ojcowizna' (patrimony) which is a set of assets inherited from our 'fathers'. It is significant that we also say „*ojczyzna-matka*" (mother-father land). Hence, homeland is an inheritance, and the 'inventory of assets' constituting the heritage, including the land, the territory, and even more importantly the spiritual values and meanings making the culture of a given nation >> (Jan Paweł II 2005: 66). This is an intentional reference to St. John Paul II's teachings and his concept of personalism which (in my opinion) provides the best scientific framework in this case. We should seek the truth about human beings and human reality, which is also the purpose of science (Jan Paweł II 1999; Cynarski, 2018). Let us use the holistic, personalistic understanding of human beings.

"Patriotism means love for what is related to the native land: love of history, tradition, language or the native landscape. This is love that also embraces the works of one's fellow citizens and the fruit of their genius. A challenge for this love comes from any threat faced by the value which is one's native land" (Jan Paweł II 2005, p. 71-72). On the other hand <<"Nation" stands for a collective which finds its fatherland in a specified area of the world and is distinguished from the others by its own culture>> (Jan Paweł II 2005, p. 74). Polish patriotism traditionally is defensive and historically is associated with the years of striving for national independence. It is not similar to the imperial patriotism of other nations. It is also strongly linked to Catholicism because the Catholic Church helped the Polish nation to survive the times of enslavement during the partitions by foreign powers, as well as years of occupation and the communist regime in Poland. According to the Polish Pope, <<The countries of Western Europe today are at a stage which could be referred to as "post-identity phase">> (Jan Paweł II 2005, p. 91).

1.1. Many centuries of heritage

Each Polish person can and should take pride in the many centuries of historical heritage, as emphasized by President Andrzej Duda (the motto above). In its heroic history, Poland successfully defended Christianity and Western European civilization twice – in wars against the Turkish Empire and Bolshevik Russia. These facts are symbolised by the Battle of Vienna (King Jan III Sobieski, 1683) and the Battle of Warsaw (Marshal Józef Piłsudski, 1920) (Pawełczyńska 2014). Particularly the latter was a great effort of the entire nation and a victory changing the fortunes of the world.

Furthermore, Poland was a land of freedom, religious tolerance, and democracy cultivated by the nobility. Hence, this at times is appreciated, with an emphasis to the "at times": "… a country which has survived similar to those of Poland does not need a tutor in democracy. Poland does not owe anything to Europe. Yet Europe owes more to Poland than it knows or would like to know" (Ungureanu 2016, p. 61). Obviously, this opinion is exaggerated and untrue to some extent. In fact, Poland does owe a lot to Europe and Western culture. Poland is a country and nation which has produced remarkable scholars (Mikołaj Kopernik, Maria Skłodowska-Curie) and artists (Fryderyk Chopin, Jan Matejko), poets and writers (Adam Mickiewicz, Juliusz Słowacki, Henryk Sienkiewicz), heroes of national uprisings and wars (Romuald Traugutt, Witold Pilecki[1]), and finally the saint Pope, John Paul II and "Solidarity". The Pope himself was very proud of Poland's contribution to the heritage of the western civilization (cf. Jan Paweł II 2005, p. 141-144). Ewa Polak-Pałkiewicz (2015) insists that the fortunes of Polish nobility, the true heroes, should be restored in the Polish consciousness since "this is required by our spiritual culture" and the sense of justice. The fact that Polish history and culture are still fairly unknown worldwide presumably results from the previous lack of adequate historical policy adopted by Poland. This does not change the fact that first of all, it is Polish people who should be well acquainted with these.

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[1] The author lists names of great Poles, keeping in mind foreign readers, unfamiliar with Polish history.

Knowledge of a language is presumably a requirement (to get acquainted with the national cultural code), but it is far from being sufficient. A nation is a phenomenon related to the sphere of culture, as a socio-cultural reality. National character can be distinguished. "The qualities of the Polish national character, rooted in nobility, as a rule, are recognized to include the capability of great effort, dedication, manfulness, courage, love of freedom, tolerance, chivalry, and individualism and fantasy. On the other hand, there are some traits with negative connotations, such as lack of tenacity and economic resourcefulness, propensity for comfortable living, aiming for splendor, excitability, uncritical copying of foreign models …" (Krawczyk 1990, p. 83).

Is Polish identity endangered? According to Andrzej Nowak, in Poland: "there are people who are fierce enemies of Polish character (Polish-ness)" (Karnowski & Karnowski 2015, p. 27). What is the origin of 'oikophobia', i.e. hatred of one's nation? Whose interests are represented by those assailing Polish national pride, dignity, and identity? Perhaps, as pointed out by Gursztyn (2015, p. 32), anti-Polonism is controlled by external centers, certain political communities in Germany, Russia, or the USA (?). Some people in Poland do not quite identify themselves with Polish-ness. The former Prime Minister of the Polish government once presented the following opinion: "Polish-ness is abnormality – such association comes to my mind with painful intensity whenever I touch upon this unwanted subject matter" (Tusk 1987, p. 191). If someone does not completely accept the Polish cultural code and has a problem with Polish-ness, perhaps they should not represent Poland and aspire to be part of its elite (Pawełczyńska 2014). This code is not limited to the anthem, emblem, colors, the Polish language, and the elementary reading list. This is also familiar with the history of Poland, its cultural heritage, traditions of national independence, Catholic religion, and the canon of Latin culture.

Poland is a heritage of the Roman Catholic country of the Piast Dynasty, but also the open and tolerant EU country of the Intermarium. Here, in the Republic of Poland, there is a place for various people. Yet it should be represented by the elites of the Polish nation, showing 100% identification with the nation: patriotic elite [2], fostering Polish national interest, supporting development and promotion of Polish culture, cultivating this tradition, and drawing any progress therefrom. Once a Polish nobleman, 'Sarmatian', was a citizen of the First Republic of Poland, a powerful country in Europe in those times. Andrzej Maksymilian Fredro, a 17th-century thinker, was rightly proud of its culture, political system. He lauded moral virtues resulting from Christianity and pointed to the fact that these are the foundations of Polish society (Fredro 2014).

1.2. Axiology

The set of values constituting the Polish cultural code is linked with the values of Christian personalism, Romanticism, and chivalric ethos, as well as the Polish language and history, and the Latin cultural heritage, but not with the ethical relativism of postmodernism or slogans of progress contrary to tradition. Maria Rodziewiczówna (1864-1944), a Polish writer, today somewhat forgotten, left the following comment: "Let there be at least one nation which continues to cherish the old-fashioned idea of chivalry and honor; let there be at least one nation which values honor above affluence" (Głuszenia 1997, p. 186).

Krystyna Grzybowska saw the causes of the European identity crisis in the moral crisis.

"This is how it happened: away with the backward world of Christianity, and in particular Catholicism, with the moral rules which imposed limitations on the game of life, because ideologists have and still are seeking to deprive Europeans of the sense of their own value and to transform the continent into an animal farm, where – like in Orwell's novel, pigs will be, and indeed already are, in power. Piggish ways symbolise liberty, and this is promoted by TV stations of the whole Western world, and to make sure the process is effective it is necessary to start by educating children so that sex becomes a determinant of freedom and joy of life." (Grzybowska 2015, p. 80; cf. Orwell 1945, 1949).

Indeed, culture devoid of inhibitions turns into its contradiction. Without discipline, it is hard to develop self-discipline, without normative ethics and practice of character – self-control. Moral crisis frequently is a start of civilization downfall (*Vide* ancient Egypt and the Roman Empire).

The theoretical perspective for the scientific deliberations undertaken here is in this case based, as it was mentioned earlier, on the sociology of culture and sociology of nation in the context of present political changes. The research problem is related to the essence of Polish national identity and a reflection on the problem of Poland's cultural identity in the context of the European integration process. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to describe and attempt an explanation of the dominant axiology related to this identity, as well as opportunities and threats in historical, religious, and local (domestic) and international (particularly European) contexts. The author is trying to point out measures to protect national identity as well as European identity, the Latin civilization.

2. Materials and Methods

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[2] Nota bene, it is significant that it was the Polish elites that were mainly exterminated from 1939 by German and Soviet occupants.

The adopted approach in connection with the above issues is based on the qualitative analysis of mass media communications (mainly Polish right-wing periodicals paying more attention to these issues and more often discussing the problem of national identity). The reference materials, selected in a targeted way, include columns and articles from selected weeklies, as well as related literature. Generally, an analysis of broader discourse related to this problem is provided in this study (Krippendorf 2004). This is a time of political change in Poland, where the argument of national identity is used by the political parties (especially the right-wind). This is also an important problem for the European Union, in a situation of migrant crisis. A heated discussion sweeps through these Polish weeklies. Therefore, the discourse mainly from the last 10 years (2010−2019) was taken into account in several right-wing titles, because these focused more on the problem of cultural heritage and national identity.

3. Results

3.1. Religious context

Poland is a country of valiant bishops and martyrs, St. Adalbert and St. Stanislaus. Later, there were other valiant priests, such as St. Maksymilian Maria Kolbe, Jerzy Popiełuszko and for instance the 2,801 Polish clergymen murdered in Dachau. Of particular meaning, there were the announcement of Mary, the God's Mother as the Queen of Poland and the vows taken in Jasna Góra by King John II Casimir Vasa (1609-1672). The sign of the final years of the twentieth century was the appointment of Karol Wojtyła, the cardinal of Cracow, for the post of the bishop of Rome, and later announcement of the sainthood of John Paul II / Jan Paweł II.

Polish Roman Catholic Church helped the nation survive the times of partitions, Germanisation, and Russification, and then the period of communism and atheisation. Polish culture, in the areas of ethics and rituals, as well as architecture, arts, literature, and language – is strongly associated with Christianity represented by the Latin Church, and consequently with the heritage of the Occidental civilization (Zamoyski 2008; Davies 2014). "Warneńczyk, Traugutt, Pilecki, and Popiełuszko were victorious – in the moral, spiritual, and religious sense but also – in longer timeframes – in political terms. For Poles, it is important to be closer to God than their executioners can be. The blood spilled in the vast majority of the Polish needs, in the name of God, Honour, and Fatherland. It was believed that Polish martyrs and heroes were received by Christ as victors" (Pawlicki 2016, p. 48).

Jan Paweł II taught that love of the Fatherland, civic involvement, and political choices are moral tasks and duties (cf. Jan Paweł II 2005). He pointed out that patriotism results from the Decalogue, the commandment "Honour thy father and thy mother". He was very critical of liberalism, as a doctrine posing hazards to society. He called for the moral and spiritual renewal of the nation and the country, in the Holy Spirit. The teachings of the Pope and Saint were derived directly from the Gospel and traditions of the Catholic Church and emphasized the moral foundation of social order and civilization. "The Decalogue, a heritage of the Old Covenant between God and Israel, was confirmed in the Gospel as a moral foundation of the New Covenant in the Blood of Christ. This moral foundation comes from God as rooted in the wisdom of the Creator and Father and the Divine Providence. At the same time, the moral foundation of the Covenant with God is for man and his ultimate good" (Jan Paweł II 2006, p. 57), and for orderly co-existence in the family, nation, and within the human community.

Clashing with the civilization of Russia (Koneczny 1962, 1982; Biliński 2001; Huntington 2006) was always dangerous for Poland. Moscow's aggressive imperialist policy is a continuation of Asian thinking about a state – in the spirit of Genghis Khan. Likewise, the mentality of Russians who mostly support their "Tsar", manifesting the cult of power, at its core is foreign to Europe (cf. Rojek 2014). In this cultural clashing and for other challenges faced by Europe, it is difficult to overestimate the role of the Church and Pope as moral authorities.

Today, the clashing of the conservative approach with the supporters of "social progress" and moral liberalism is a fight for the shape of western civilization. The war for Christian civilization was already discussed by Józef Maria Bocheński (1999), a remarkable Polish philosopher, logician, and anti-communist. Traditional Latin culture survived in Poland, despite the half-a-century-long communist regime, but today it faces the confrontation with the attitudes promoted by mass culture based on extreme individualism, relativism, and post-modernist rejection of the concept of truth.

Fromm redefined the concept of "religion". He did not use the term regarding a system that must contain a concept of God, or faith in God or deities, or would be equivalent to the cultivation of sacred rituals. He used the word to refer to any system of thinking and ethics, characteristic for a group of people (and reflected by actions), which provides an individual with some frames for the orientation and object of worship (or object of faith). He also pointed out (just like M. Eliade) the close relationship between religion and human needs. Religion itself, for him, is a social phenomenon. Fromm (1989, p. 92) states that: "...one cannot envisage even one society, past, present or future, that would have no religion". The question is not: "religion or no religion?", but "what kind of religion?", and whether "it fosters human growth?". Because, as Fromm wrote in *Man for Himself*, a need for the system of orientation and worship is the most powerful source of energy for man. Having no choice whether or not to have a religion, he may only choose between its types, authoritarian religion or humanist religion.

Is there an ideological substitute of religion that could ensure moral order for Europe?

3.2. Local context

'Patriotism', as a love for one's fatherland is an accepted concept, yet it is used by liberal and leftwing communities with reluctance (like the terms "God" and "honor"). On the other hand, the term "nationalism" is treated as an unequivocally pejorative concept (cf. Nikitorowicz 2013; Conversi 2014). According to Skórczewski (2013), for western authors, western nationalism is acceptable while Central European is evil and dangerous. Generally, however, for European progressive elites, nationalism and national identities are a relic of old times and an anachronism and proof of backwardness. Whereas, in fact, 'nationalism' simply means love for one's nation. A nationalist does not have to be a chauvinist or a xenophobe. Nationalism does not have to be aggressive towards other nations. Similarly, local patriotism is distinguished and promoted, as love for one's city/village or region where an individual was born or lived in their youth (Vide – Euro-regional policy). Generally, however, the term patriotism is related to the fatherland. For a Pole, this is Poland defined by the state borders or the Eastern Borderlands described in The Trilogy by Sienkiewicz. In particular, for peasants and inhabitants of rural areas in Poland, their identity to a large extent is determined by the love for their patrimony, their religiosity, and their conservatism (cf. Nalaskowski 2015).

Europe is dominated by bourgeois ethos - rather cowardly, mercantile, with a cult of material goods, and a predominant tendency for "having" rather than "being", competitive and opportunistic, with an instrumental and interest-based approach to social contacts (cf. Fromm 1989; Golka 2008, p. 191-196). Is it possible that Poland, which by doings of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, lost its elites of spiritual aristocracy, has managed to preserve chivalric ethos? Indeed, yes, but it is not widespread. The more common attitude is based on the romantic freedom-loving spirit, contributing to the Polish national character (Nowak 2014).

As for the loyalty of ethnic and religious minorities, it took various forms in the history of Poland. There have always been dilemmas related to cultural (socio-cultural) and national identity. There were and still are Tatars devoted to Poland, as well as patriots of Jewish origin, or other Poles of foreign descent, but there were also traitors, originating from Catholic noble families. If a given ethnic or national group acts against the interest of Poland and Poles, their self-identification is likely dissociated from Polish-ness. In the case of ethnic groups, identity-related dilemmas – social, cultural and political - may (but do not have to) be stronger.

3.3. International context

Determinants of national identity can be considered in the international context taking into account Europe or the global scale. Uniting Europe is a political idea that is readily promoted by liberal and left-wing communities and minorities. For cosmopolitans, this is a way to escape Polish-ness. Being a European is interesting, but – in fact - what does it mean ?. What values are to be shared by inhabitants of Europe if the European Union (contrary to the concepts adopted by its founding fathers) does not recognize the Christian roots? We shall return to this matter later in consideration.

Because of the cultural globalization process, the identity and existence (survival) of small nations are endangered (cf. Cynarski 2003; Wojtkowiak 2005). Therefore, attention to the strong Polish identity of Poles is a "to be or not to be" requirement for this nation. Japan, despite the lost war, was able to introduce its numerous national treasures to the universal human heritage and mass culture worldwide. Poland, which for a long time was suppressed by partitioning and invading powers, as well as the communist regime imposed by force, so far had limited opportunities in this area. According to the prophecies of various historical figures (Lodovico Rocca, 19th century; Bronisław Markiewicz, 1842-1912), the Polish language would be taught worldwide. Poland will be an important country in Europe and the international sphere (Łaszewski 2010). Similar opinions are voiced by the American politologist and futurist George Friedman (2009). Yet the realities of today are still far from this glory.

3.4. What about Europe's identity?

Today in the European Union, there are opposing phenomena. On the one hand, emphasis to "post-national nature of united Europe", and on the other hand, the support of the EU for activities aimed at preservation of Europe's identity and cultural diversity (cf. Kaczmarczyk 2011; Vidmar-Horvat 2012). However, at the core of European civilization is (or perhaps was) Christian Latin culture (cf. Grzegorczyk 1999; Davies 2010). This is where Europe's spiritual strength must have resulted from. "The stones will cry out" from the Gospel may be related to thousands of Christian churches in Europe, today frequently abandoned. These walls and stones speak of the glory of the Lord, Jesus Christ. This relates not only to the wealth of material culture – sacred art and architecture but also to a large body of literary works and many spheres of spiritual culture (humanism, personalism, the institution of the university, and so on).

As suggested by an outstanding Polish and European philosopher Leszek Kołakowski (2014), the dechristianization of Europe is a road to its self-annihilation, which is initiated by the moral crisis. A lack of ability to distinguish between good and evil leads to axiological confusion. Additionally, rejection of Christ's teachings and Christianity means a destruction of the binding force and the foundation of the civilization. Similar opinions were voiced by other authors (cf. Jan Paweł II 2005; Cardia 2013). John Paul II defined Nazism and Communism as the ideology of evil, yet he also noticed the ideology of evil in operations of certain international institutions which in fact use "human rights against people and against the family" (Jan Paweł II 2005, p. 20). What is the purpose of upturning the traditional social order?

Do journalists who warn us of great threats have a point? "Destruction of the Christian roots by left-wing communities has produced a void, filled with babbling about << self-realization>> or <<rights of sexual minorities>>. Europe has lost identity, at its own volition, therefore it is defenseless." (Zechenter, 2015). The spiritual void of Europe is infiltrated by Islam (Lisicki 2015), and at the other end, a threat and attacks come from the empire of V. Putin (Rojek 2014; Święchowicz 2014) (*Vide*: Georgia, Ukraine). Is it similar to the situation in the literary vision by Tolkien – in the battle of Minas Tirith (The Lord of the Rings. Return of the King), where the Middle Earth is assaulted at the same time from the south and the east? In the novel, the knight named Aragorn calls for joint effort and fight in defense of the West. "Identity of Poland, identity of Europe, and – in the broadest sense – identities of areas inhabited by people originating from European cultures (…) is not linked with a requirement for ethnic uniformity" (Skwieciński 2015; cf. Golka 2010). However, the thing is here about a certain cultural core. Left-wing ideology of multiculturalism for Europe turns out to be deadly. According to Skwieciński, Muslim migration constitutes a threat to Europe's identity. Was St. Jan Paweł II right when he said that "Countries of Western Europe today are at a <<post-identity>> stage" (Jan Paweł II 2005, p. 91)? Did they lose the memory of their heritage (Jan Paweł II 2005, p. 148-150)?

Kostrzewa-Zorbas (2015, p. 23) claims that "Conversion of the Federal Republic of Germany into the United States of Germany, and the European Union into the United States of Europe poses a threat of disintegration of the societies and the civilization". Intellectuals and academics who do not allow being gagged by political correctness, e.g. J. Raspail, A. Nowak, and others, point to leftist ideas leading to a catastrophe of the western civilization. These are multiculturalism, exaggerated compassion, short-sightedness, and stupidity[3] (Raspail 1973; Karnowski & Karnowski 2015; Rybińska 2015). Or might this be a targeted policy to dismantle national states, enfeeble the Catholic Church and create a multicultural European structure where immigrants support programs of left-wing parties? Yet, Muslims will probably aim for the specifically understood peace when the whole world adopts the Sharia law (Mrozek-Dumanowska, 2000, p. 104).

The consensus of rationally thinking people is shared by a well-known Polish left-wing politician, Leszek Miller, who said in an interview: "there may come a time when we will have to fight with weapons in our hands in the streets of European cities to retain our identity. At this point we can see a Trojan horse being built, right in front of flabbergasted Trojans, and what's more, with their money. Of course we, residents of the EU states, are the Trojans". He also said that Oriana Fallaci – a journalist, author of nine books, opponent of multicultural policies – was right (Warzecha 2016).

In 2001, Victor Orban could be perceived as a politician who found his Christian and national identity and took steps to save national and European heritage, which at that time sounded like a prophecy (Cynarski 2001). Fifteen years later, this turned out to be rather relevant – in opposition to the ideologies predominant in Europe, he consistently carried out his mission, defending Hungarian interests and Christian cultural identity. In his report on the condition of the country in 2015, the Hungarian Prime Minister pointed out: "The second and third decade of the 21st century will be a migration period. We have not been prepared for the era which starts now (…) The reality is that in numerous European countries there is a growing, well-established, and lasting world of parallel societies (…). The reality is that the newcomers do not even think about adopting our lifestyles, because they believe their own is more valuable (…) Whether we like it or not, people's migrations are never peaceful. When large human masses look for a new home, conflicts are inevitable because they seek to occupy areas which are already inhabited by someone, where people are at home and want to defend their homes, their cultures and their lifestyles" (Orban 2016, p. 72-73).

One of the founding fathers of the European Union, Robert Schuman came up with a concept for the EU flag, with 12 stars from Virgin Mary's scapular, positioned against a blue background. He introduced himself – "Robert Schuman, a servant of God". And today, how much is left from the Christian core of this civilization? Would it be that the only values of "post-Christian" Europe are those related to biological aspects, such as security, comfort, health, and good looks, as suggested by Lisicki (2015)? We should also point out here hedonistic, pleasure-related values, also resulting from individualism, egoism/egocentrism (cf. Fromm 1989; Cynarski 2003).

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[3] As an opposite of wisdom.

Lech Makowiecki explains the problem with the simple words: "… many non-believers today appreciate the role of the Christian religion for the optimal growth of the society. During the centuries a well-tested model of family was developed, friendly to procreation, giving a sense of fulfillment to the woman and the man, ensuring peace and security to children." (Makowiecki 2016).

4. Discussion

How to cultivate Polish (and European) identity?

In Poland, there are still too few good historical, patriotic films, about heroes known from Polish history. One good TV series ("Days of Honour") does not settle the matter. Previously, a proper historical policy was missing. As noticed by Makowiecki (2015a), liberal, left-wing circles promote anti-national, anti-Polish (?) and anti-Catholic attitudes. "Communities such as nation, Church or even family have always been treated with suspicion by people favoring liberal individualism. After all, these are nests of traditional imagery and customs, and they impose limitations on their members' liberties. The fact that they open other, more important spheres of freedom, such as actual development of the common world, does not fit in the liberal horizon" (Wildstein 2013, p. 63).

It would be worthwhile to make high-budget movies about Witold Pilecki, the battle of Monte Cassino, the war and victory of 1920, about the great victories of the Kingdom of Poland (Grunwald, Klushino, Vienna, and Párkány), about the Polish scientists who worked out the Enigma, about Polish travelers, geographers, discoverers, engineers, composers, about Jan Kochanowski and Romantic poets. Such works definitely fascinated viewers worldwide (cf. Dziemidok 2002). It was worth supporting initiatives aimed at the restoration of Old Polish chivalric traditions (Zabłocki 2000; Cynarski 2008; Hundert 2012; Sawicki 2012, 2014). This way of cultivating Polish heritage should receive special backing from the state. Especially since this is a reference to what is most beautiful and most noble, the way allows strengthening the body and the mind. This could and should be used in the education of young people (physical, defense, and patriotic education). A similar value is carried by other ethos-based traditions of martial arts, when they refer to universal values, like those practiced within IPA - Idokan Poland Association[4], under the patronage of St. Michael the Archangel (saint of the Church and archetype of the power of Good) (cf. Sieber et al., 2009). Perhaps it would be worthwhile to recall selected aspects of Sarmatism as a national concept and a collection of conservative values? Stanisław Cynarski (1974) generally presents a critical approach to the ideology of Sarmatism, in particular as an explanation for the brawling of the nobility and anti-progressive ideology. However, this was an ideology that also contained several positive values fostering the development of a nation. A Sarmatian was a synonym of a valiant warrior, a knight (Cynarski S. 1974, p. 263). This was the orientation towards one's national tradition, with a critical attitude to foreign influences. It was characterized by such features as chivalric spirit, Christian (Catholic) faith, and attention to civil liberties of the Poland of nobility.

Christian principles and chivalric code should be present in school teaching and educational curricula (cf. Van Engen, Whiteman and Woodberry 2008; Cynarski 2014) and national culture. By highlighting its national heritage, Poland will then be culturally more attractive to foreign tourists (Cynarski 2015; Wyleżałek 2015).

"Instruction of young people should be based on the presentation of historical truth and valuable models to be copied. Waiting ahead is a really difficult time that requires the highest dedication and even sacrifices. No one will sacrifice their life for gender. Not even a gay or a feminist. Particularly, not them. In a demoralized, hedonistic, and cowardly world, there is no place for such 'irrational' behaviors. Due to this, a well-filmed story of a slightly old-fashioned, idealistic, or even naïve (according to today's criteria) character may captivate viewers and restore the forgotten world of values. In the context of the upcoming threats – may unify the nation and save its freedom." (Makowiecki, 2015b).

Representatives of patriotic left-wing politics, like Józef Piłsudski in the past, or liberals may feel very well in this world of values if they respect the defined cultural code underlying Polish-ness. An interesting indicator of one's attitude to the native values is one's opinion of the Indomitable Soldiers who even in hopeless situations remained indomitable and fought to the end. Are they recognized today as heroes by all Poles? This is how Lech Makowiecki defined the alternative: patriotism and glory or treachery and ignominy:

"… Again the best ones will perish at their post…
The most cowardly will chose a way to exile…
The most wicked will surrender to collaboration with the enemy…"[5]

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[4] Operating since 1993, this is an academic, educational and sports association, a public-benefit and nonprofit organisation. IPA in cooperation with the European Nobility Club promotes the idea of homo creator nobilis – chivalric/knightly way to match the 21st century (Cynarski 2009).

[5] L. Makowiecki, fragment of the poem "*Oda do wolności*" (Ode to freedom) from the volume "Pro Publico Bono".

However, the left-liberal side prefers values (anti-values) in "freeing" man from the limitations of religion, nation-state, and family (cf. Dziemidok 2002; Giddens 2002; Kaczmarczyk 2011; Vidman-Horvat 2012; Cardia 2013; Skórczewski 2013). The necessity of efforts to preserve Polish and European identity is also indicated by such analysts of modern threats as Stefan Wojtkowiak (2005), Bronisław Wildstein (2013), and Anna Pawełczyńska (2014).

5. Conclusions

Popular in the mass media sphere, left-wing ideologies (postmodernism, moral liberalism, and multiculturalism) as well as extreme individualism, constitute a danger for the world of traditional, religious, and national values. Therefore, protection of cultural heritage and identity requires the active involvement of the state, as well as non-governmental institutions and citizens. On the other hand, one must consider threats originating from outside of the European civilization, resulting from the clashing or the "war of civilizations" (concepts and studies by Feliks Koneczny, Józef Maria Bocheński and Samuel Huntington), not only related to ideas.

One comes to such practical conclusions as to the necessity to support cultural heritage, implement appropriate historical policy, and patriotic education. We must hope that the current and future Polish authorities do their best in this area. This is when Poland may become a refuge for European Latin civilization. The same relates to the whole world of western civilization. Perhaps in the face of the partial downfall of Christian culture, the world "needs proud warriors (…) to stand on the side of the truth" – as encourages James Caviezel (2018). It is necessary to fight for the moral truth and freedom, by consistently remaining faithful to the truth. It appears that publicists writing for conservative weeklies try to do this.

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